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Abstract Informal payments are deeply ingrained in the
health care sector of most Central, Eastern and Southern
European countries. Evidence suggests that the price paid
informally to medical staff is negotiated either directly or
indirectly between patients and medical staff. The aim of
this paper is to measure the imperfect information that
exists on the amount that has to be paid informally to
medical staff. We measure the extent to which patients pay
more than the amount medical staff expect informally and
the extent to which medical staff request less than patients
are willing to pay informally. A two-tiered stochastic
frontier model is developed to estimate indicators of
patients’ and medical staff’s imperfect information on
informal payments and the effects on the amount the other
party is minimally expecting or maximally willing to pay
informally. The estimates are based on informal payments
to medical staff in the inpatient health care sector in
Albania. We use data from the Albania Living Standards
Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005. The pooled samples
include 707 individuals who have visited inpatient health
care services in these 2 years. Our results show that med-
ical staff has less information on the patients’ maximum
willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical
staff’s minimum expected amount. These estimates do not
depend on categories of illnesses but on certain socio-
demographic characteristics.
Keywords Informal payments  Imperfect information 
Stochastic model  Maximum willingness to pay informally
JEL Classification I11  I19  D82
Introduction
Paying informally for health care services is a wide spread
phenomenon in many Central, Eastern and Southern
European countries [13, 16, 24, 31, 32, 35]. Generally,
health care seekers are asked or expected to pay various
forms of under-the-table payments to health care practi-
tioners, which are usually defined as ‘informal payments’
[17, 23].
Evidence from many countries suggests that the amount
paid informally, is negotiated between patients and physi-
cians either directly or indirectly [11, 31, 35]. The process
is described as an ‘unofficial health care market’ [32]
where physicians participate directly in the negotiation
process, or the negotiation is done by their ‘brokers’1 [36].
Despite the fact that the existence of informal payments is
widely recognised, little evidence is available on the role of
information that patients and physicians have, in deter-
mining the amount paid informally.
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1 ’Brokers’ are evidenced by Vian et al. [36] as people (not
necessarily medical staff) who serve as intermediaries between
patients and doctors. An example can be the nurse who tells how
much a patient should give to the doctor (some time this is also done
by guards, etc.).
123
Eur J Health Econ (2012) 13:777–788
DOI 10.1007/s10198-011-0331-1
The aim of this paper is to estimate the imperfect
information that exists on the amount paid informally to
medical staff for inpatient health care and measure its
effect on the actual amount paid. Imperfect information in
health care markets is mostly studied either from the per-
spective of information on medical conditions and treat-
ment [5], or health insurance markets [1, 30]. However,
physicians may (mis)use their power and market position
to impose extra payments on patients. As it is often the case
in post-communist countries [15], these extra payments
refer to money paid informally as gifts or under-the-table
payments. Both physicians and patients are aware of the
‘costs and benefits’ involved, and are active players in this
‘informal market’. Such payments allow patients to jump
the queue, receive higher quality of service and sometimes
to receive more care [2, 23, 24]. From an economic per-
spective, informal payments can be seen as a way to
allocate scarce resources, where the market prevails over
the rationing systems thought up by the government. The
market price (or the amount paid informally) is influenced
by the information that the medical staff has on the
patient’s willingness to pay, and information that the
patient has on the medical staff’s expected amount.
As otherwise similar patients may pay different amount
informally, we focus on the information that both parties
(patients and providers) have on the final amount paid.
Here, the maximum willingness to pay refers to the max-
imum amount that the patient intends to pay, and the
minimum expected amount refers to the amount medical
staff at least expects to receive informally and is not related
to the direct costs of health care. These are derived from
variation in the actual amount paid informally. We develop
a two-tiered stochastic frontier model to measure the effect
of imperfect information of medical staff and patients on
the amount paid informally [19, 20, 29].
We use data from the Albanian Living Standards Mea-
surement Survey 2002 and 20052 (ALSMS) to obtain
estimates of informal payments for inpatient health care
service. As it is difficult to define and measure all these
payments, we use data on gifts to medical staff gathered by
the Albania LSMS.3 We hereafter refer to these gifts as
informal payments. Informal payments are widely pre-
valent in Albania with the largest incidence in the inpatient
care services [2]. These payments account for about 25 per
cent of total out-of-pocket expenditure [36] in inpatient
services and 7 per cent in outpatient services [22].
Albania has inherited a universal health care system
from the communist regime with a widespread net of
public health care services and limited private providers
[27]. In the period 2002-2005 (when the data for our
analysis were collected), the financing of the health sector
in the country was fragmented, with the Health Insurance
Institute paying for most of the salaries of primary care
physicians, selected drugs and few high-end diagnostics
[2]. All other public health care costs were covered by the
Ministry of Health budget. Formal payments were limited
to a small fees paid mostly for outpatient health care, while
services in inpatient care were supposed to be ‘free of
charge’. Despite this, the scarcity of drugs, low paid
medical staff and inefficiency of the system has led to a
situation where patients pay for (otherwise free) drugs or
services.4
The paper is divided into six sections. Section two
reviews the international empirical evidence on informal
payments and discusses the main aspects of informal
payments in the Albanian health care sector. Section three
outlines the theoretical model, while section four and five
discuss the dataset and empirical results. Section six pro-
vides the concluding remarks.
Theoretical background
There are no studies available that have analysed imperfect
information of medical staff and patients on the amount
paid informally in health care. The studies reviewed here
include studies on the process of paying informally (when
do patients pay informally, what is paid for, to whom and
how) and the determinants of informal payments and in
post-communist countries.
Studies find that both patients and medical staff may
influence the amount paid informally. Ensor [15] argues
that one of the main types of informal payments is when
medical staff misuse their power and market position to
impose extra payments, (other reasons include payments
for extra services due to insufficient funding). Carlton and
Perloff [12] emphasise that the availability of information
may influence the price of a good by lowering it.5 This
implies that the actual amount paid informally to medical
staff is determined by the knowledge of consumers and
providers about the actual ‘informal market’ price.
2 Albania Living Standard Measure Survey. World Bank.
www.worldbank.org/lsms [4].
3 Albania LSMS gathers specific information on gifts made to
medical staff. Such gifts are considered informal in Albania’s health
care context and are not allowed by the legislation in place. We have
used this as the best possible measure of informal payments in the
country.
4 Although Albanian legislation provides for free inpatient hospital
care for all, out-of-pocket expenditures in the event of hospitalisation
are substantial, with informal payments accounting for at least one-
quarter of all payments [2].
5 Carlton and Perloff [12] show that improving information can lower
the prices. When information is more available customers may better
estimate the real price.
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We assume that determinants of the actual amount paid
informally for inpatient health care services are factors
related both to the demand for health care (e.g. including
income or wealth, education and age), and supply side
factors (e.g. quality of the physician’s service and type of
treatment). Patients’ motives to pay informally to medical
staff in hospitals are implicitly linked to patients’ maxi-
mum willingness to pay informally for better quality and
access to services. Looking at the attitudes of patients
towards publicly provided care in Bulgaria, Pavlova et al.
[28] find that individuals are willing to pay if they are
offered good quality and quick access.
Wealth is usually considered an important determinant
of health care demand. Evidence shows that usually those
who cannot afford to pay for health care find alternative
means (i.e. using saving, or borrowing money) to pay for
such services [16, 31, 33]. As a result, wealth and income
are believed to be less important in determining the amount
paid than informal payments. Although it is usually stated
that in post-communist countries, the rich pay more for
health care than the poor [6, 14, 26], when it comes to the
amount paid informally, no significant differences are
documented between these groups [31, 34].
Age and education, as determinants of health care
demand, are also believed to influence the amount of
informal payments. Evidence suggests that elderly patients
pay lower amounts for health care services [31] and higher
educated people higher amounts [24]. However, the evi-
dence remains mixed on how these two factors influence
informal payments to medical staff, depending also on the
type of services [36].
On the supply side, informal payments are believed to
be triggered by restrictive circumstances like the low
wages of medical staff in the public sector [14, 21, 31].
Shahriari et al. [31] argue that with the increase of the
number of physicians, the equilibrium price that they
charge should go down. In public health care services of
most post-communist countries, the prices for services are
fixed and what is observed in practise is a large variety of
services that would match patients’ increased expectations.
Generally, the highest informal payments are observed in
hospitals and the lowest payments are made to general
practitioners [31]. Given the specifics of some treatments
(e.g. giving births) medical staff may also be approached
for an informal payment before the services are provided to
secure their availability. In these cases, negotiations over
the price may also be done in advance [11].
Studies looking at the determination of prices related to
informal payments (in Albania or elsewhere) are limited.
However, there is evidence showing that the way patients
are asked for such payments vary. Based on qualitative
data, a study conducted in Albania [36], reports that
patients mainly get information on the amounts to be paid
by: (1) asking directly the nurse or the physician, or (2)
getting information from relatives or friends who have had
similar procedures. The authors also mention that the
process often is not hidden at all, and in cases of inpatient
treatment (i.e. surgeries), the amount is often agreed
beforehand while the payment is done after the treatment or
operation. The amount paid is not always fixed and is
determined by certain characteristics of both parties.
Attributes of patients (e.g. economic status, place of resi-
dence, political or intellectual status) and features of pro-
viders (e.g. qualification of medical staff, speciality,
location of facility, etc.) influence the amount of informal
payments [35].
Methodology and model
In this section, we present the two-tiered stochastic frontier
model used to measure the effect of imperfect information
on informal payments in inpatient health care services, and
also discuss some of its limitations.
We start by assuming that both patients and medical
staff have less than perfect information about the minimum
expected informal payments or maximum willingness to
pay informally, respectively. The main reasons behind this
imperfect information are the nature of informal health
payments. Direct payments and gifts to medical staff in
Albania are not legally allowed, but they are very often
tolerated. However, medical staff may face legal conse-
quences if they explicitly ask for such payments. Often,
patients are aware of this, but they are also aware of the
fact that without such payments, they may be denied the
service, or that the quality of services delivered will be
simply poorer. Given this, patients could try to get a certain
quality of treatment with the lowest amount of ‘gift’ pos-
sible. They could try to seek good quality medical staff and
pay just the ‘minimum expected amount’ for a particular
service. However, in the absence of perfect information,
patients may end up paying higher amounts than the min-
imum expected amount. The difference between the actual
payment and the medical staff’s minimum expected
amount represents ‘patient’s ignorance’. On the other hand,
the medical staff could try to maximise the profits by
asking for the amount that the patient is willing to pay.
However, the informal nature of such payments increases
the costs of gathering information, and medical staff may
also end up in getting lower amounts than the maximum
that patient would be willing to pay informally. The dif-
ference between the actual payment and patient’s maxi-
mum willingness to pay informally represents ‘medical
staff’s ignorance’ [19, 20].
We assume that informal payments are a linear function
of characteristics of medical staff and patients,
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respectively. The medical staff’ characteristics are repre-
sented in our model by illnesses or diseases (I). The
patient’s characteristics include: demographic variables
(G), insurance status (S), the ln of household income (Y),
level of education (E), number of days stayed in hospital
(D) and whether the informal payment to medical staff was
voluntary or expected/requested (R). The logarithm of the
amount expected to be paid informally (IP*) is determined
by:
ln IP ¼ b0 þ b1Ii þ b2Gi þ b3Si þ b4 ln Yi þ b5Ei þ b6Di
þ b7Ri
ð1Þ
where b are coefficients that measure the impact of medical
staff and patients characteristics on the amount paid
informally. In our empirical analysis, we have used the
natural logarithm of the amount paid informally as this
yielded better fitted models.
The observed (ln) amount of informal payment IP is
assumed to be stochastic and can be above or below the
actual payment IP* depending on the characteristics of
patients and medical staff that we mentioned above. The
size of the deviation from actual informal payment repre-
sents the effect of imperfect information of medical staff
and patients. Let v (medical staff imperfect information)
and w (patient imperfect information) represent respec-
tively the negative and positive deviations of lnIP* and g
represents the normal error term. The observed level of
informal payments is then related to the expected level by:
ln IPi ¼ log IPi þ vi þ wi þ gi ð2Þ
If we combine Eqs. 2 and 1, we obtain:
ln IP ¼ b0 þ b1Ii þ b2Gi þ b3Si þ b4 ln Yi þ b5Ei þ b6Di
þ b7Ri þ gi þ vi þ wi
ð3Þ
We assume that v and w are one-sided error terms with
expectations EðviÞ ¼ lv\0 and EðwiÞ ¼ lw [ 0. The
term lv is the negative deviation of informal payment from
the actual payment, which can be interpreted as medical
staffs’ informal market ignorance. Likewise, lw is the
positive or upward bias in paying informally and can be
seen as representing patients’ informal market ignorance.
Equation (4) constitutes a two-tiered stochastic frontier
model developed by Polachek and Yoon (1987) [29]. In
order to derive the likelihood function, the following
assumptions regarding the error components are made: g
has a normal distribution with zero mean and variancer2u;
-v and w follow the exponential distribution with lv and
lw, respectively; and g, v and w are independent. Polacheck
and Yoon [29] derive the likelihood function for this sto-
chastic frontier model as:
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Uð:Þ is the distribution function of the standard normal
distribution and n is the number of observations. hv and hw
measure relative medical staff’s and patient’s informal
market information, while lv and lw are the medical staff
and patient informal market ignorance.
The disadvantage of the above model is that negative
and positive stochastic deviations based on medical staff
and patient informal market ignorance (measured by lv and
lw) are assumed to be the same for everyone. To avoid this,
we have parameterised them [19, 20]. This way, we allow
these parameters to vary with observable characteristics:
hvi ¼ av0 þ av1Grural þ av2Di þ av3Ri þ av4I1i
þ av5I2i þ av6I6i ð5Þ
hwi ¼ aw0 þ aw1Grural þ aw2Di þ aw3Ri þ aw4I1i
þ aw5I2i þ aw6I6i ð6Þ
The first terms of Eqs. 5 and 6 represent characteristics
of patients like if they come from rural areas (Grural), days
spent in hospital (Di) and if the informal payment was
requested/expected (Ri). Other variables in these equations
represent information on illnesses and diseases. I1, I2 and
I6 represent the illness and diseases of the categories 1, 2
and 6, respectively (see Table 1 for the full list of
categories of illnesses/diseases). Category 1 includes very
mild conditions or no conditions; category 2 is more related
to blood and cardiovascular diseases; and category 6
groups together diseases of digestive organs and those
caused by infections. The choice of these categories was
based on the different impact that these illnesses/diseases
have on the health status but also on the characteristics of
the data (categories 1 and 2 have the highest incidences
among all others).
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Data
The data for estimating the two-tiered stochastic frontier
model are taken from the Albania Living Standard Mea-
surement Survey (ALSMS) 2002 and 2005.6 These datasets
include a set of questions on health care visits and treat-
ments concerning inpatient services, (visits to hospitals for
chronic illnesses/diseases). The variables that we use in our
analysis come from identical questions used in these
Table 1 Diseases and illnesses grouped according to the factor analysis
Category 1
No chronic diseases; acute illness cold/flu; no acute illness Category 1 includes very mild conditions or no conditions at all. Conditions
grouped here are: acute cold/flu, having no chronic diseases, or having no acute
illness.
Category 2
Chronic diseases of blood and blood producing; chronic
other disability; acute illness heart
Category 2 is more related with blood and cardiovascular diseases and includes:
chronic diseases of blood and blood producing organs, other chronic
disabilities and acute heart conditions. All these conditions have similar
consequences and affect the patients’ abilities (they contribute to disability,
and lower the quality of life).
Category 3
Chronic congenital abnormalities; acute illness headache Category 3 groups together diseases which are more related with chronic
anomalies and acute disorders and includes: chronic congenital abnormalities
and acute headache. They all share common consequences, (i.e. constant or
abrupt pain).
Category 4
Chronic diseases of respiratory organs; acute illness lung Category 4 groups diseases which are related with respiratory organs like;
chronic respiratory organs diseases, and acute lung illnesses. All these
conditions have similar causes and consequences, share the same symptoms
and they also may lead to irreversible conditions.
Category 5
Chronic nervous system and sense organ diseases; acute
illness kidney; acute illness other trauma
Category 5 groups together conditions of the nervous system, kidney and other
traumas. Conditions included here are: chronic nervous system and sense organ
diseases, acute kidney illnesses and other acute traumas. They all bring
psychological problems as they are associated with pain and sensitivity losses.
Category 6
Chronic infectious diseases; chronic diseases of digestive
organs; acute illness stomach; acute other illness
Category 6 groups together diseases of digestive organs and those caused by
infections and include: chronic infectious diseases, chronic diseases of
digestive organs, acute stomach illnesses and other acute illnesses. All these
conditions have similar causes (infectious diseases, immunological causes, or
dietetic issues), and share similar symptoms (nausea, diarrhoea, and similar
pain).
Category 7
Chronic diseases of urinary-genital system; acute illness
liver; acute illness broken bone
Category 7 includes chronic diseases of urinary-genital system, acute liver
illnesses, and acute broken bone illnesses. These conditions share similar
consequences (broken bones are related with issues of other internal organs
resulting from traumas, such as liver rupture, and urinary problems).
Category 8
Chronic endocrine diseases; acute illness diarrhoea; acute
illness ear/nose/throat
Category 8 includes chronic endocrine diseases, acute diarrhoea illnesses, and
acute ear/nose/throat illnesses. Most of these conditions can be seen as related
to one another (i.e. diabetes causes diarrhoea, disorders of thyroids are related
to difficulties in swallowing, etc.).
6 LSMS is a national representative survey that collects information
on different indicators of health, education, economic activities,
housing and utilities for households all around Albania. The 2002 and
2005 Albania Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS)
provides individual level and household level socio-economic data
from 3600 to 3638 households respectively drawn from urban and
Footnote 6 continued
rural areas in Albania. The sample was designed to be representative
of Albania as a whole, Tirana, other urban/rural locations, and the
three main agro-ecological areas (Coastal, Central, and Mountain).
The survey was carried out by the Albanian Institute of Statistics
(INSTAT) with the technical and financial assistance of the World
Bank and the Department for International Development (DfiD).
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2 years. Individuals are asked if they have visited inpatient
health care services in the last 12 months. They have
provided information on the amounts they have spent as
out-of-pocket payments (including informal payment to
medical staff, drugs, laboratory work, transport, and other
treatment payments). Based on the information available in
the survey, we have only used the information about gifts
paid to medical staff in the inpatient services (hospitals).7,8
The same definition is also used in other studies on infor-
mal payments in the country [2]. The data we use come
from two modules of ALSMS: the individual module, and
the household module. The individual module includes
information on 707 individuals who visited inpatient ser-
vices in 2002 and 701 individuals in 2005. For our analysis,
we have omitted observations with missing values or zero
amount of informal payments. Our final sample consists of
748 individuals who have visited inpatient services either
in 2002 or 2005 and have paid informally. The control
variables included in the models represent characteristics
of the patient (demand side), type of illness/disease (see
previous section and ‘Appendix’).
Table 2 shows the difference in characteristics between
patients paying informally on voluntary bases to medical
staff and those who are requested or expected. As we can
see the mean value of informal payments is significantly
higher for patients who have been requested or expected to
pay. The value of these amounts can increase significantly
when the patients are threatened not to receive the service.
The share of patients being requested or expected to pay
informally, is larger in 2005 (56 per cent) than in 2002
showing that the situation has become worse in 2005. The
share of rural residents is much higher and statistically
significant among those who have been requested or
expected to pay informally (61 per cent). The difference in
the level of per capita income, health insurance or level of
education is not statistically significant between groups
where these informal payments are voluntary and requested
or expected respectively.
In order to increase the precision of the parameter esti-
mates of our independent variables, we have reduced the
number of variables on acute and chronic illnesses or dis-
eases by running a factor analysis on the 27 different types
of them. We have extracted eight factors (representing 8
groups of acute and chronic illnesses) with a factor loading
0.2 or more. In total, in both years, there are 4906 indi-
viduals who provided information on acute illnesses and
3654 on chronic illnesses. Out of these individuals, 954
individuals have reported on both acute and chronic illness
during these years. To estimate the factor loadings, we have
added one additional category for each variable, ‘no chronic
disease’ (for those reporting only on chronic illness) and ‘no
acute illness’ (for those reporting only on sudden illnesses).
Most of the factors combine diseases which are either
related (categories 1 and 8), or can be symptoms of common
causes (categories 4 and 6), or can have common conse-
quences (categories 2, 3, 5, 6, 7), or have in common that
they provide serious discomfort or pain (categories 5, 6, 7).
Results
Table 3 presents the estimation results of three sets of
estimates: the ordinary least square (OLS), two-tiered
Table 2 Sample means of individual characteristics for patients that have paid voluntary or have been requested or expected to pay informally
Variables Voluntary informal payments Requested or expected informal payments
Amount of informal payments per day hospitalised (in Euros) 5.48*** (10.60) 9.78*** (22.25)
Year of surveya 0.37*** (0.48) 0.56*** (0.50)
Monthly income per capita (in Euros) 45.77 (45.01) 52.80 (74.12)
Rural resident 0.48*** (0.50) 0.61*** (0.49)
Has health insurance 0.41 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49)
Level of educationb 1.40 (0.63) 1.32 (0.60)
Number of observations 312 436
Stars indicate if the mean for the group is significantly different from the mean of other groups. Standard deviations are in brackets. * Significant
at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level
All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 [8]
a Year of survey is ‘0’ for 2002 and ‘1’ for 2005
b Education level is categorical (‘0’ none education; ‘1’ primary education; ‘2’ secondary education; ‘3’ university education)
7 Based on broader definitions of informal payments in health care,
they may include also other expenses made privately that otherwise
were supposed to be free of charge (i.e. medicines purchased outside
the hospital, etc.). This detailed information can not be obtained from
LSMS 2002 and 2005, and therefore it is not used in this paper.
8 The individual amounts of gifts paid in 2005 are deflated to reflect
2002 prices.
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stochastic frontier model with constant terms for the one-
side error terms only, and two-tiered stochastic frontier
model in which the one-sided error terms vary by
different characteristics. We use the OLS model as a
benchmark for the results of the two-tiered stochastic
frontier estimates. The estimation results of the OLS
Table 3 Parameter estimates OLS and two-tiered stochastic frontier model (standard errors in brackets)
OLS Model Frontier Models
h Constant h Varies
Coefficients of the deterministic part of the equation (b)
Constant term 5.011*** (0.559) 5.582*** (0.549) 5.878*** (0.641)
Household size -0.050** (0.025) -0.041* (0.023) -0.044* (0.023)
Civil status—married & living together 0.284** (0.138) 0.323** (0.137) 0.292** (0.137)
Rural/urban area -0.202* (0.108) -0.208** (0.103) -0.222 (0.178)
Log income per capita 0.105** (0.048) 0.083* (0.048) 0.076 (0.048)
University education 0.384* (0.227) 0.383* (0.207) 0.356* (0.200)
Age of the individual (16–30 years old) 0.242* (0.135) 0.209 (0.138) 0.183 (0.139)
Insurance -0.156 (0.111) -0.149 (0.103) -0.129 (0.103)
Year (2002–2005) -0.104 (0.107) -0.115 (0.103) -0.111 (0.102)
Category of illness 1 0.517** (0.264) 0.511** (0.216) 0.101 (0.447)
Category of illness 2 0.032 (0.178) 0.060 (0.165) 0.191 (0.265)
Category of illness 3 -0.451 (0.379) -0.544 (0.356) -0.489 (0.338)
Category of illness 4 0.018 (0.243) -0.059 (0.240) -0.009 (0.232)
Category of illness 5 0.159 (0.226) 0.182 (0.208) 0.169 (0.194)
Category of illness 6 0.055 (0.242) 0.029 (0.215) -0.354 (0.762)
Category of illness 7 0.454* (0.253) 0.498** (0.209) 0.463** (0.208)
Category of illness 8 -0.017 (0.251) 0.009 (0.253) 0.031 (0.242)
Requested/expected informal payment 0.489*** (0.101) 0.508*** (0.096) 0.702*** (0.199)
Nr of days hospitalised -0.027*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.002) -0.033*** (0.006)
Random error term (hu) 1.066*** (0.144) 1.073*** (0.116)
Coefficient of the negative one-sided error term (hv)
Constant term 1.180*** (0.222) 1.204*** (0.288)
Rural/urban area – – -0.053 (0.175)
Requested/expected informal payment – – -0.169 (0.181)
Nr of days hospitalised – – -0.002 (0.009)
Category of illness 1 – – 0.446 (0.357)
Category of illness 2 – – -0.236 (0.370)
Category of illness 6 – – 1.016 (3.917)
Coefficient of the negative one-sided error term (hw)
Constant term 3.124 (3.565) 4.401 (6.029)
Rural/urban area – – -0.496 (1.387)
Requested/expected informal payment – – 0.632 (1.696)
Nr of days hospitalised – – -0.016 (0.015)
Category of illness 1 – – -1.504 (4.496)
Category of illness 2 – – 0.357 (1.175)
Category of illness 6 – – -0.825 (1.515)
Log likelihood -1253.97 -1224.43 -1215.67
Number of observations 748 748 748
Standard deviations are in brackets
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
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model and the stochastic frontier estimations show that
the statistically significant parameter estimates are overall
similar.
Household size appears to be negatively related to the
amount paid informally and the effect is statistically sig-
nificant in the three estimated models. The results are
comparable to the results of other studies on the effect of
household size in reducing the amount allocated for health
care or informal payments [10]. Larger households can be
more exposed to the risk of being sick, have less to spend
per capita, and can also call upon informal care from the
other family members. They are more likely to have young
children or elderly individuals, and therefore, more likely
to make use of health services. The same holds for people
living in rural areas. Income per capita is also more likely
to be low in larger households, which reduces their ability
to pay.9 An additional argument is the lack of a universal
child benefit in Albania which makes large households
more economically vulnerable.
Rural residents also appear to pay lower amounts
informally. Previous evidence [35] suggests that rural res-
idents may pay less when getting services within their
village or community but they are likely to pay more when
visiting facilities in big cities. Giving the limitations of our
data, we cannot control for such effects.
Age is represented by dummy variables and the category
16-30 years old is tested against the other categories. The
positive coefficient for this category shows that on average
older individuals pay smaller amounts informally in inpa-
tient health care services (probably because of more fre-
quent health care visits and lower income at the same
time). This is in the same line with findings of previous
studies [7]. Patients who are married and living together
pay higher amounts informally to medical staff compared
to patients who are widowed, divorced or single. This may
also indicate the extent of intra-family support through
adults of working age. Higher income patients pay also
higher amounts suggesting a close link between income
and ability to pay [16, 18].
Higher educated people pay higher informal payments
to medical staff. This can relate to the higher opportunity
costs that they face when ill, which may increase their
willingness to pay for health care. Higher educated people
invest more in their health and are also more able to gen-
erate income and therefore can afford to pay more for
better services or fast recovery [9, 25].
Health insurance decreases the amount paid informally
but its effect is not always statistically significant. This
shows that such insurance is of little relevance. This is
mainly because in 2002 and 2005 there was no direct and
clear link between the Albanian health insurance and
inpatient care services [2].
Out of eight categories of illnesses or diseases only
category 1 and category 7 appear to have a statistically
significant effect on the amount paid informally to med-
ical staff. Category 1 includes very mild conditions or no
conditions at all. The positive and statistically significant
effect may indicate that patients who do not use health
care often are more likely to pay informally if compared
to other categories. Category 7 includes internal organ
disorders (liver and urinary-genital system) or broken
bones. The positive and statistically significant effect may
indicate that patients with severe and life-threatening ill-
nesses or diseases pay higher amounts compared to
patients with milder illnesses or diseases. The lower level
of significance for other categories presents evidence for
the homogenous amounts paid informally for illnesses and
diseases. This shows that the amount of informal pay-
ments is not much influenced by patients’ illnesses or
diseases.
Patients pay higher amounts informally when they are
asked for or when they are expected to pay (the coefficient
indicating whether the informal payments were requested
is positive and statistically significant in the three models).
This shows that informal payments in Albania are not
‘gratitude payments’ and that medical staff can influence
the amount paid. The number of days hospitalised nega-
tively influences the amount paid informally. This rela-
tionship shows that patients with more hospitalisation days
may have more information on the informal amount
expected from the medical staff and at the same time they
may also have less income (income is negatively correlated
with health status).
Estimation of ignorance about informal payments
The lower part of Table 3 gives the estimates of the pa-
rameterised specification of hv and hw when both hs are
constant and when they vary by different characteristics.
Except for the intercept in the medical staffs’ equation, all
other parameters are statistically not significant implying
that imperfect information of medical staff and patient is
virtually constant in our model and varies little by the
characteristics included in the analysis. Table 4 gives the
estimated values of the two one-side error terms for both
medical staff and patients. We interpret these terms as
indicators of the effect of imperfect information on the
amount paid informally. The table gives the averages for
total sample or sub-samples [19, 20]. For each individual in
our sample, the observed value of the informal payment is
either below or above the average value of these payments.
9 A World Bank Report (Albania—Urban Growth, Migration and
Poverty Reduction, World Bank 2007) [3] mentions that in 2005 on
average a rural resident had about 14 per cent less per capita
consumption if compared to an urban resident.
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The difference indicates the imperfect information that
patients and medical staff have on the amount the other
party is requesting or willing to pay respectively.
Medical staff’s imperfect information: EðewÞ ¼ 1=
ð1  lwÞ; Patient’s imperfect information: EðevÞ ¼ 1=
ð1 þ lvÞ.
We calculate the means of medical staff and patients’
imperfect information of v and w for the sample as a whole
and for some specific groups.10 The results indicate that
imperfect information for medical staff and patient is
similar when hs are assumed to be constant and when the
hs vary by sample characteristics. For example, for the total
sample patients pay on average 45% more than the mini-
mum value expected by medical staff (as the error term is
normalised to 1, the deviance is calculated as 1.45 -
1 = 45% for the positive error term). On the other hand,
patients pay on average 43% less that the maximum that
they are willing to pay informally (for the negative error
term, the deviance is calculated 1 - 0.57 = 43%). Gen-
erally, we observe that medical staff imperfect information
is relatively larger than imperfect information of patients
for most of the groups. This indicates that medical staff has
less information on the amount that patients are willingness
to pay informally than the patient has on the expected value
of the medical staff.
Table 5 presents the maximum amounts that patients are
willing to pay informally to medical staff, the minimum
amounts that medical staff are expecting, as well as the
averages of the actual amounts paid. The values calculated
in the table are based on the coefficients of imperfect
information indicators in Table 4.11 The results show that
the highest medical staff’s expected value is for the resi-
dents of rural areas who also pay the highest amount.
Another category with high expected value is the one
representing patients to whom informal payments are
requested or expected. Medical staff in these cases can set
their expectations higher than average knowing that they
can impose such payments.
Illnesses categories 1, 2 and 6 do not appear to have a
big impact on the medical staff minimum expected amount
(though as we mentioned before they also have little
explanatory power on the imperfect information of medical
staff or patients).12 Medical staff’s expected values for all
these categories appear to be lower than the total sample
showing that the amount medical staff is expecting does
not depend significantly on the illness but rather on other
characteristics of the patients. The lowest patient’s will-
ingness to pay informally estimated in our analysis is for
category 2, which includes long lasting chronic conditions
showing that patients in this category are less willing to pay
(as they know that such conditions will last longer).
Discussion
Generally, the findings show that the amount paid as
informal payment to medical staff is not entirely depen-
dent on the level of income but depends also on socio-
demographic characteristics (i.e. the household size, rural/
urban area, education and civil status). This suggests that
the final amount paid is (to a great share) prone to the
particular social situation and position of the patient
seeking inpatient health care. Therefore, the actual
amount paid informally can be considered as the final
outcome of a (explicit or implicit) negotiating process
between patients and medical staff. The information that
each party has on the other’s minimum expected amount
or maximum willingness to pay influences the actual
amount paid.
We found that medical staff has less information on the
patient’s maximum willingness to pay informally than
patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected
amount. This seems reasonable as patients can gather more
information on the medical staff’s minimum expected
amount (using their personal network) than the medical
staff can gather on patient’s maximum willingness to pay











Total sample average 0.57 1.45




Nr of days hospitalised 0.56 1.29
Category of illness 1 0.64 1.47
Category of illness 2 0.51 1.24
Category of illness 6 0.70 1.35
10 Indicators on imperfect information for patients and medical staff
are calculated based on Eqs. 5 and 6. Values are calculated for each
observations and the table displays means for the whole sample.
Different categories in the table represent the means for that sub-
sample (i.e. imperfect information for patient living in rural is
calculated taking into account only those who live in these area).
11 Patient’s willingness to pay informally is calculated as the realistic
value paid (the average of the amount paid informally for that
particular service) over the difference between hundred percent and
imperfect information indicator of patients.
12 Category 7 is omitted from these calculations as the model could
not converge when this was included.
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(information is more costly to obtain by medical staff than
by patients). This finding is consistent with what previous
studies have found on the ways that patients use to get
informed on the doctor’s expected informal payments [35].
We show that thanks to this information patients can
reduce the amount of actual payment paid. However, the
actual mean payment remains large and in all cases is
larger than the medical staff’s expected value. Groups like
rural residents or those to whom informal payments are
requested from seem to be more vulnerable to such pay-
ments as they also pay the highest amounts. It looks like
medical staff is expecting much more from such patients
having more information on them (e.g. knowing that
patients coming from distant areas have higher opportunity
costs as travelling costs and time costs are higher since
hospitals are located in urban areas).
Although we have tried to use the full potential of the
ALSMS data, there are some limitations to what we can
actually explore on the interactions between patients and
medical staff. Our data provide limited information on the
specific treatment performed, and on medical staff’s char-
acteristics (i.e. position, salary, etc.). Moreover, we cannot
distinguish between payments made to physicians or other
medical and supporting staff. Our analysis is therefore
limited only to the amounts paid informally to medical
staff. This may lead to an underestimation of informal
payments in Albania. The specific way the questions are
asked in the ALSMS and the context of the country do not
allow us to distinguish between other formal and informal
payments even if other categories of out-of-pocket pay-
ments are considered.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the actual amount paid
informally to medical staff is influenced by imperfect
information that patients and medical staff have on each
other maximum willingness to pay or minimum expected
amount. By using a two-tiered stochastic frontier model,
we have estimated indicators of such imperfect information
and the effect on the actual amount paid. These indicators
are an important tool in understanding how characteristics
of patients or medical staff can increase or reduce informal
payments. Despite the fact that patients seem to have on
average better information than medical staff on the
amount that the other party is requesting informally, we
show that the average amount paid remains considerable
and the highest payments are imposed on vulnerable group
of society. Such amounts call for more measures that limit
the phenomenon in the health care sector. Policymakers
could use the information on expected payment or maxi-
mum willingness to pay informally to adjust the estimates
on formal costs or to calculate the increase in patient’s fees
that would be accepted both from medical staff and
patients. Future research could try to refine such measures
by differentiating between different types of treatments and
services.
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Appendix
See Table 6.
Table 5 Willingness to pay informally to medical staff and amount expected by medical staff for various groups (The amount paid informally is
the average per day hospitalised)
Medical staff’s minimum
expected amount (in Euros)
Patient’s maximum
willingness to pay (in Euros)
The average of actual
amount paid (in Euros)
Total sample average 5.18 14.75 8.13
Rural area resident 6.39 14.45 9.92
Requested/expected informal payment 5.33 10.52 8.13
Nr of days hospitalised 4.23 9.34 6.59
Category of illness 1 3.71 11.55 6.08
Category of illness 2 4.18 8.34 6.31
Category of illness 6 4.00 1.52 6.81
All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 [8]
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